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Federico Echenique

Global rank #428 99%

Institution: University of California-Berkeley

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://eml.berkeley.edu/~fechenique/

First Publication: 2003

Most Recent: 2023

RePEc ID: pec5 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 1.34 3.25 2.01 0.00 13.87
Last 10 Years 2.35 4.26 6.87 0.00 24.77
All Time 9.38 10.62 26.64 0.00 85.43

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 45
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 46.85

Publications (45)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2023 Decreasing Impatience American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 3
2023 Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2023 Approximate Expected Utility Rationalization Journal of the European Economic Association A 3
2022 Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match American Economic Review: Insights A 4
2022 Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2022 Twofold multiprior preferences and failures of contingent reasoning Journal of Economic Theory A 5
2021 A Characterisation of ‘Phelpsian’ Statistical Discrimination Economic Journal A 2
2021 Recovering Preferences From Finite Data Econometrica S 3
2021 Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium American Economic Review S 3
2021 Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2020 Spherical preferences Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2020 Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 3
2019 General Luce model Economic Theory B 2
2018 On Multiple Discount Rates Econometrica S 2
2017 Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2017 Response time and utility Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2016 EFFICIENCY AND BARGAINING POWER IN THE INTERBANK LOAN MARKET International Economic Review B 4
2016 Clearinghouses for two‐sided matching: An experimental study Quantitative Economics B 3
2015 The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2015 How to Control Controlled School Choice American Economic Review S 2
2015 Savage in the Market Econometrica S 2
2014 The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content American Economic Review S 3
2012 When does aggregation reduce risk aversion? Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2012 Contracts versus Salaries in Matching American Economic Review S 1
2011 Testable Implications of Gross Substitutes in Demand for Two Goods American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 3
2011 Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2011 The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations Journal of Political Economy S 3
2010 On behavioral complementarity and its implications Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2009 Supermodularity and preferences Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2009 Profit maximization and supermodular technology Economic Theory B 2
2009 English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2008 Ordinal notions of submodularity Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2007 Counting combinatorial choice rules Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2007 A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2007 Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2007 A Measure of Segregation Based on Social Interactions Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
2006 Is School Segregation Good or Bad? American Economic Review S 3
2004 A characterization of strategic complementarities Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2004 Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2004 Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2004 Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2004 A weak correspondence principle for models with complementarities Journal of Mathematical Economics B 1
2003 Strong comparative statics of equilibria Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2003 Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities Economic Theory B 1
2003 The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice Economic Theory B 1