Institution: University of Cambridge
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6.03 | 0.00 | 6.54 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case with transferable utility | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2000 | Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 1997 | Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1996 | Value, Consistency, and Random Coalition Formation | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1989 | Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |