Institution: Università degli Studi di Bergamo
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 3.03 | 1.18 | 0.50 | 4.71 | 81% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 3.03 | 2.86 | 0.50 | 6.39 | 78% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 3.03 | 3.53 | 0.50 | 7.06 | 85% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Tullock contest with reference‐dependent preferences | Economic Inquiry | C | 2 |
| 2022 | The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2022 | The coordinating power of social norms | Experimental Economics | A | 2 |
| 2021 | Inequality and competitive effort: The roles of asymmetric resources, opportunity and outcomes | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 4 |
| 2021 | Not all group members are created equal: heterogeneous abilities in inter-group contests | Experimental Economics | A | 4 |
| 2020 | Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 3 |
| 2018 | Affirmative action and retaliation in experimental contests | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 2 |
| 2013 | Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games | European Economic Review | B | 3 |