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Joseph Farrell

Global rank #418 99%

Institution: University of California-Berkeley

Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/farrell

First Publication: 1985

Most Recent: 2017

RePEc ID: pfa35 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 2.01 0.00 2.01
All Time 16.09 5.03 11.90 0.00 92.84

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 38
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 46.28

Publications (38)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2017 Some Simple Analytics of Vertically Linked Markets Review of Industrial Organization B 1
2015 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission at 100: A Symposium on FTC Economics Review of Industrial Organization B 1
2012 Choosing the rules for consensus standardization RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2012 Economics at the FTC: Drug and PBM Mergers and Drip Pricing Review of Industrial Organization B 6
2011 Economics at the FTC: Hospital Mergers, Authorized Generic Drugs, and Consumer Credit Markets Review of Industrial Organization B 4
2010 Economics at the FTC: Mergers, Dominant-Firm Conduct, and Consumer Behavior Review of Industrial Organization B 3
2009 Economics at the FTC: Retrospective Merger Analysis with a Focus on Hospitals Review of Industrial Organization B 3
2008 How Strong Are Weak Patents? American Economic Review S 2
2007 Do investors forecast fat firms? Evidence from the gold-mining industry RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2005 COMPETITION OR PREDATION? CONSUMER COORDINATION, STRATEGIC PRICING AND PRICE FLOORS IN NETWORK MARKETS* Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2003 Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network American Economic Review S 1
2000 Is Cost-Cutting Evidence of X-Inefficiency? American Economic Review S 2
1998 The Vertical Organization of Industry: Systems Competition versus Component Competition Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 3
1995 Talk Is Cheap. American Economic Review S 1
1994 Irrational behavior in the AT&T investment game Economics Letters C 2
1993 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1992 Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces. Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
1992 Standard Setting in High-Definition Television Brookings Papers on Economic Activity B 2
1991 Horizontal Mergers: Reply. American Economic Review S 2
1990 Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay. Journal of Political Economy S 2
1990 One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1990 Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis. American Economic Review S 2
1989 Optimal Contracts with Lock-In. American Economic Review S 2
1989 Cheap Talk with Two Audiences. American Economic Review S 2
1989 Competition between and within teams : The Lifeboat Principle Economics Letters C 2
1989 Renegotiation in repeated games Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1989 Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1989 Cheap talk can matter in bargaining Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1988 Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium Economics Letters C 1
1988 Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
1988 Partnerships Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
1987 Rigidity vs. License. American Economic Review S 1
1986 A note on inertia in market share Economics Letters C 1
1986 Experience rating and premium risk Economics Letters C 1
1986 How effective is potential competition? Economics Letters C 1
1986 Standardization and variety Economics Letters C 2
1986 Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation American Economic Review S 2
1985 Owner-consumers and efficiency Economics Letters C 1