Institution: Georgetown University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 4.04 | 2.02 | 6.05 | 2.52 | 14.63 | 91% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Optimal Design of Research Contests | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2000 | Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2000 | The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1999 | Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1 | European Economic Review | B | 2 |
| 1997 | Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy | B | 2 |
| 1997 | Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained. | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 1996 | Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 1994 | Price competition in noncooperative joint ventures | International Journal of Industrial Organization | B | 1 |
| 1990 | A multiple-object auction with superadditive values | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 1987 | Rebates, introductory sales and the Coase conjecture | Economics Letters | C | 1 |