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Maitreesh Ghatak

Global rank #792 99%

Institution: London School of Economics (LSE)

Primary Field: Development (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ghatak/

First Publication: 1999

Most Recent: 2023

RePEc ID: pgh108 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.75
Last 10 Years 0.40 3.42 0.00 0.00 8.59
All Time 6.43 20.51 3.52 0.00 71.93

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 36
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 33.91

Publications (36)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2023 Why Do People Stay Poor? Quarterly Journal of Economics S 5
2022 Editorial Economica C 7
2019 Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance? Economic Journal A 5
2018 Commercialization and the decline of joint liability microcredit Journal of Development Economics A 3
2017 Profit with Purpose? A Theory of Social Enterprise American Economic Journal: Economic Policy A 2
2016 Group lending without joint liability Journal of Development Economics A 3
2016 Credit market frictions and political failure Journal of Monetary Economics A 3
2015 Theories of Poverty Traps and Anti-Poverty Policies World Bank Economic Review B 1
2014 Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching Journal of Development Economics A 2
2014 Land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers Journal of Development Economics A 2
2013 Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 4
2013 Bailouts and the Optimal Taxation of Bonus Pay American Economic Review S 2
2013 Trade and the allocation of talent with capital market imperfections Journal of International Economics A 2
2012 Incentives and the De Soto Effect Quarterly Journal of Economics S 3
2011 Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents Journal of Public Economics A 2
2011 Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents Journal of Public Economics A 2
2008 Status Incentives American Economic Review S 2
2007 Wealth inequality and collective action Journal of Public Economics A 3
2007 Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility Journal of Public Economics A 2
2007 Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2007 Land reform and agricultural productivity in India: a review of the evidence Oxford Review of Economic Policy C 2
2006 Subcontractors for tractors: Theory and evidence on flexible specialization, supplier selection, and contracting Journal of Development Economics A 3
2005 Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents American Economic Review S 2
2004 Eviction threats and investment incentives Journal of Development Economics A 2
2003 Can unobserved heterogeneity in farmer ability explain the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity Economics Letters C 2
2003 Incentives, Choice, and Accountability in the Provision of Public Services Oxford Review of Economic Policy C 2
2003 Erratum to "The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice" [J. Devel. Econ. 60 (1999) 195-228 Journal of Development Economics A 2
2002 Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal Journal of Political Economy S 3
2002 A simple model of inequality, occupational choice, and development Journal of Development Economics A 2
2002 Erratum to "The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice" [J. Devel. Econ. 60 (1999) 195-228 Journal of Development Economics A 1
2001 Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
2001 Financially Interlinked Business Groups* Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2001 Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives Review of Economic Studies S 3
2000 Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk Journal of Development Economics A 2
1999 The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice Journal of Development Economics A 2
1999 Group lending, local information and peer selection Journal of Development Economics A 1