Institution: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Primary Field: Public (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 12.11 | 2.02 | 10.09 | 0.00 | 24.22 | 95% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1986 | The political economy of state level welfare benefits | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 1985 | Prison overcrowding | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 1982 | A limited defense of Pareto optimal redistribution | Public Choice | B | 1 |
| 1978 | Externalities, Extortion, and Efficiency: Reply. | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 1978 | On the political economy of food stamps | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 1977 | Campaign expenditures and election outcomes: A critical note | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 1977 | Donor optimization and the food stamp program | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 1976 | Transfers and Pareto optimality | Journal of Public Economics | A | 2 |
| 1975 | Externalities, Extortion, and Efficiency. | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 1974 | An experiment in public choice | Public Choice | B | 1 |
| 1972 | Welfare Economics and Welfare Reform. | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 1972 | Benevolence, malevolence and economic theory | Public Choice | B | 2 |