Institution: University of Guelph
Primary Field: Experimental (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 6.05 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 6.56 | 84% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2012 | Market composition and experience in common-value auctions | Experimental Economics | A | 1 |
| 2011 | On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |