Institution: Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 0.67 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6.37 | 0.00 | 6.37 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | Project selection: Commitment and competition | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2015 | Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2014 | Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2013 | Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 3 |
| 2012 | Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2007 | Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |