Institution: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://eio.usc.es/pub/julio/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.02 | 1.18 | 0.00 | 3.20 | 59% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.02 | 5.38 | 0.25 | 7.65 | 86% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Loss allocation in energy transmission networks | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 4 |
| 2016 | Cognitive performance in competitive environments: Evidence from a natural experiment | Journal of Public Economics | A | 2 |
| 2016 | Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Gas transport networks: Entry–exit tariffs via least squares methodology | Energy Policy | B | 4 |
| 2012 | Performing best when it matters most: Evidence from professional tennis | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 3 |
| 2008 | Cores of convex and strictly convex games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2008 | Ranking participants in tournaments by means of rating functions | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 4 |
| 2006 | Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |