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Thomas A. Gresik

Global rank #1715 98%

Institution: University of Notre Dame

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://sites.nd.edu/tgresik/

First Publication: 1989

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pgr299 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 1.68 0.00 1.68
Last 10 Years 0.00 3.69 1.68 0.00 9.05
All Time 0.00 16.76 10.72 0.00 44.24

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 19
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 27.60

Publications (19)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Tax policy competition under destination‐based taxation Review of International Economics B 2
2025 Playing easy or playing hard to get: When and how to attract FDI Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 3
2020 Unilateral tax reform: Border adjusted taxes, cash flow taxes, and transfer pricing Journal of Public Economics A 2
2017 Immobilizing corporate income shifting: Should it be safe to strip in the harbor? Journal of Public Economics A 3
2016 Allowing firms to choose between separate accounting and formula apportionment taxation Journal of Public Economics A 1
2011 Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2011 The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2010 Formula apportionment vs. separate accounting: A private information perspective European Economic Review B 1
2010 Introduction to the special section on multinational taxation and tax competition European Economic Review B 2
2001 Rationing rules and European Central Bank auctions Journal of International Money and Finance B 1
1997 Competition between asymmetrically informed principals Economic Theory B 2
1996 Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach Journal of Public Economics A 2
1996 Incentive-Efficient Equilibria of Two-Party Sealed-Bid Bargaining Games Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1994 Incentive compatible regulation of a foreign-owned subsidiary Journal of International Economics A 2
1991 Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1991 The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1991 Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1991 Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1989 The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms Journal of Economic Theory A 2