Institution: Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: https://www.sites.google.com/site/vitaligretschko/?pli=1
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.81 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 1.48 | 43% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.83 | 1.18 | 0.00 | 4.00 | 63% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 4.84 | 2.19 | 0.34 | 7.37 | 85% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Information design in sequential procurement | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2022 | Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment | Journal of Public Economics | A | 5 |
| 2020 | Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 4 |
| 2016 | Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |
| 2015 | Excess information acquisition in auctions | Experimental Economics | A | 2 |
| 2014 | On the strictly descending multi-unit auction | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 3 |
| 2014 | Information acquisition during a descending auction | Economic Theory | B | 2 |