Institution: City University of New York (CUNY)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 2.02 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 3.03 | 69% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.02 | 2.02 | 1.01 | 5.05 | 72% |
| All Time | 2.69 | 6.73 | 3.03 | 1.01 | 13.45 | 91% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Minimizing settlements | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |
| 2021 | Gradual college admission | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2019 | Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2016 | Monotone strategyproofness | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2012 | Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 2012 | Erratum to: Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 2011 | A comment on "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231] | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2010 | Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 2009 | Bilateral commitment | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2009 | Constrained school choice | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2007 | More strategies, more Nash equilibria | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2004 | Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |