Institution: Sciences Po
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 35% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.71 | 0.50 | 5.21 | 73% |
| All Time | 6.73 | 0.00 | 6.73 | 0.50 | 13.96 | 91% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Selective memory of a psychological agent | European Economic Review | B | 2 |
| 2020 | Cheap talk with coarse understanding | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2018 | Communication with evidence in the lab | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2017 | Truthtelling in Matching Markets | Scandanavian Journal of Economics | B | 3 |
| 2017 | The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 2 |
| 2016 | Full disclosure in decentralized organizations | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2014 | Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure | Econometrica | S | 3 |
| 2011 | Centralizing information in networks | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2010 | Strategic Communication Networks | Review of Economic Studies | S | 2 |