Institution: Unknown
Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 29% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 5.38 | 1.01 | 0.59 | 6.98 | 85% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | The optimal regulation of a risky monopoly | International Journal of Industrial Organization | B | 2 |
| 2014 | Relative performance of liability rules: experimental evidence | Theory and Decision | C | 4 |
| 2012 | How much discretion for risk regulators? | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |
| 2010 | The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors | Journal of Public Economics | A | 3 |
| 2006 | The benefits of extended liability | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |
| 2004 | On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability | Economics Letters | C | 3 |