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Sjaak Hurkens

Institution: Barcelona School of Economics (BSE)

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://hurkens.iae-csic.org/

First Publication: 1995

Most Recent: 2019

RePEc ID: phu223 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Last 10 Years 0.00 2.02 0.67 0.50 3.20 59%
All Time 0.00 12.11 10.76 1.35 24.22 95%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 18
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 19.52

Publications (18)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2019 Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding Economics Letters C 2
2019 Optimal crowdfunding design Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2019 Dominance and Competitive Bundling American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 3
2015 On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist Journal of Mathematical Economics C 3
2012 Promoting network competition by regulating termination charges International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2009 Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion Experimental Economics A 2
2008 A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two‐way access pricing: no termination‐based price discrimination† RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2006 Endogenous private information structures European Economic Review B 2
2004 Endogenous price leadership Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2003 Free entry does not imply zero profits Economics Letters C 2
2002 On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2001 Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets Economic Theory B 2
2001 Information acquisition and entry Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
1999 Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1997 Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1996 Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1996 Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1995 Learning by Forgetful Players Games and Economic Behavior B 1