Institution: Tokyo Metropolitan University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.84 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.68 | 0.00 | 4.52 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Efficient stable matching in school choice | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2017 | Best-response potential for Hotelling pure location games | Economics Letters | C | 3 |
| 2016 | On the IENBR-solvability of two-person finite games | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2005 | Discrete fixed point theorem reconsidered | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 3 |
| 2003 | A discrete fixed point theorem and its applications | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 1 |