Institution: Universidad de Santiago de Chile
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 1.01 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 2.01 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.03 | 0.00 | 6.03 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES | International Economic Review | B | 2 |
| 2018 | Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2015 | A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |
| 2012 | Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2011 | Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts | Economic Theory | B | 2 |