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Henrik Jensen

Global rank #1974 97%

Institution: Københavns Universitet

Primary Field: Macro (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://hjeconomics.dk

First Publication: 1994

Most Recent: 2020

RePEc ID: pje99 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 1.68
All Time 5.03 4.52 12.40 0.00 42.40

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 17
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 23.73

Publications (17)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2020 Leverage and Deepening Business-Cycle Skewness American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics A 4
2018 Changing credit limits, changing business cycles European Economic Review B 3
2005 Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union Journal of International Economics A 2
2003 Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact Journal of International Economics A 2
2003 Structural convergence under reversible and irreversible monetary unification Journal of International Money and Finance B 2
2002 Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation? American Economic Review S 1
2002 Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 1
2001 To peg or not to peg?: A simple model of exchange rate regime choice in small economies Economics Letters C 3
2000 Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets European Economic Review B 1
1999 Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment American Economic Review S 2
1999 Monetary policy cooperation and multiple equilibria Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control B 1
1998 A note on discontinuous value functions and strategies in affine-quadratic differential games Economics Letters C 2
1997 Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation. American Economic Review S 1
1997 Monetary Policy Cooperation May Not Be Counterproductive Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 1
1996 Note on 'Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game' Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control B 3
1994 Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control B 1
1994 Sustaining policy cooperation between economies of different size Journal of International Economics A 1