Institution: Gakushuin University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: https://www.univ.gakushuin.ac.jp/eco/en/about/economics/member/shinsukekambe/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.02 | 1.01 | 3.03 | 69% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.02 | 1.01 | 3.03 | 58% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.04 | 1.51 | 5.55 | 83% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | The weaker player’s option to exit as a source of bargaining power in bilateral bargaining with fixed costs | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2025 | The prevalence of take-it-or-leave-it offers | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1999 | Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1990 | Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games : Two-principal case | Economics Letters | C | 2 |