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Fahad Khalil

Global rank #3259 96%

Institution: University of Washington

Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://econ.washington.edu/people/fahad-khalil

First Publication: 1992

Most Recent: 2022

RePEc ID: pkh360 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.00 2.01
Last 10 Years 0.00 1.34 0.67 0.00 3.35
All Time 2.01 7.71 4.02 0.00 27.48

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 17
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 13.80

Publications (17)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2022 Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 3
2021 Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard RAND Journal of Economics A 3
2020 Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2015 Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information RAND Journal of Economics A 3
2013 Contracts offered by bureaucrats RAND Journal of Economics A 3
2010 Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils RAND Journal of Economics A 3
2007 Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2006 Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation? Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 3
2006 INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2005 Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency Journal of Health Economics B 2
2001 Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring Journal of Public Economics A 2
1998 Contracts and Productive Information Gathering Games and Economic Behavior B 3
1998 Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1995 Collusive Auditors. American Economic Review S 2
1995 Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1994 Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature European Economic Review B 2
1992 Gathering Information before Signing a Contract. American Economic Review S 2