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Rene Kirkegaard

Global rank #1534 98%

Institution: University of Guelph

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.renekirkegaard.com/

First Publication: 2005

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pki48 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 4.02 6.03 0.00 14.08
Last 10 Years 0.00 6.03 9.05 0.00 21.11
All Time 0.00 9.05 20.11 0.00 39.21

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 17
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 31.30

Publications (17)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Multivariate Incomplete Information in the Mixture Model of Contests RAND Journal of Economics A 1
2023 Contest Design with Stochastic Performance American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 1
2023 Endogenous criteria for success Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2022 Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2021 Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions Journal of Mathematical Economics B 1
2020 Contracting with private rewards RAND Journal of Economics A 1
2019 Scale effects in multi-unit auctions Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2017 Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2014 Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2013 Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders European Economic Review B 1
2013 Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests International Journal of Industrial Organization B 1
2012 Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2009 Asymmetric first price auctions Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2008 Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2008 Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2006 A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result Economic Theory B 1
2005 Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers Economics Letters C 1