Institution: Arizona State University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 5.38 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.38 | 85% |
| Last 10 Years | 13.45 | 0.00 | 2.02 | 0.50 | 15.98 | 95% |
| All Time | 13.45 | 0.00 | 3.03 | 0.50 | 16.99 | 93% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Delegation in Veto Bargaining | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 2021 | Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications | Econometrica | S | 3 |
| 2020 | The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 2019 | A note on optimal allocation with costly verification | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 2019 | Strong Duality in Monopoly Pricing | Econometrica | S | 2 |
| 2018 | Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2017 | Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2015 | Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |