|
2008
|
Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the water and transport sectors
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2006
|
Universal service obligations in LDCs: The effect of uniform pricing on infrastructure access
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2006
|
Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach
|
Review of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2005
|
The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2004
|
Downsizing with labor sharing and collusion
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2004
|
The subsidiarity bias in regulation
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2003
|
Contracting for aid
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2003
|
Competition and the reform of incentive schemes in the regulated sector
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2003
|
Public goods with costly access
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2003
|
Collusion and group lending with adverse selection
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
A
|
1
|
|
2003
|
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
3
|
|
2002
|
Competition in gas markets
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2002
|
The natural monopoly test reconsidered: an engineering process-based approach to empirical analysis in telecommunications
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2002
|
Price discrimination and majority voting
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2002
|
Public economics yesterday, today and tomorrow
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
1
|
|
2001
|
Transport Pricing in the Electricity Industry
|
Oxford Review of Economic Policy
|
C
|
2
|
|
2001
|
Internet Peering
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
1
|
|
2001
|
Separation of powers and development
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2000
|
Group lending with adverse selection
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2000
|
Cross-subsidies and network expansion in developing countries
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1999
|
Empirical Evaluation of Regulatory Regimes in Local Telecommunications Markets
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
3
|
|
1999
|
The Efficient Mechanism for Downsizing the Public Sector.
|
World Bank Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1999
|
Competition and corruption in an agency relationship
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1999
|
The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
3
|
|
1999
|
The dynamics of reform and development in China: A political economy perspective
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1999
|
Political economy, information and incentives1
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
1998
|
Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1998
|
Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1997
|
Environmental risks and bank liability
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1997
|
The Firm as a Multicontract Organization
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
1997
|
Collusion in Organizations
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
1997
|
repec:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:4:p:485-95
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1997
|
repec:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:4:p:519-40
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1997
|
Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
1997
|
Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
1997
|
Competition between telecommunications operators
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
3
|
|
1996
|
Structural Analysis of Auction Data.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1996
|
Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
1996
|
Industrial policy and politics
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
1
|
|
1996
|
Pollution permits and environmental innovation
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1996
|
Pollution permits and compliance strategies
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1995
|
Sequential Location Equilibria under Incomplete Information.
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
4
|
|
1995
|
Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
1
|
|
1995
|
Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1994
|
Location distortions under incomplete information
|
Regional Science and Urban Economics
|
B
|
4
|
|
1994
|
Environmental policy, compliance and innovation
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1994
|
Access pricing and competition
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1993
|
Structural econometric analysis of descending auctions
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1992
|
Regulation by Duopoly.
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
1992
|
REGULATION BY DUOPOLY
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
1992
|
Econometric Analysisof Collusive Behaviorin a Soft‐Drink Market
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
3
|
|
1992
|
Should governments commit?
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1991
|
Auction design and favoritism
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
1991
|
The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
2
|
|
1990
|
A structural approach to empirical analysis of collusive behavior
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
3
|
|
1990
|
Competition on many fronts: A stackelberg signaling equilibrium
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1990
|
Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1990
|
The regulation of multiproduct firms : Part I: Theory
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1990
|
The regulation of multiproduct firms : Part II: Applications to competitive environments and policy analysis
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1990
|
Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1990
|
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market.
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
1989
|
Rational expectations with imperfect competition : A Bertrand-Edgeworth Example
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
1989
|
Existence of a spatial equilibrium
|
Journal of Urban Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1988
|
repec:bla:scandj:v:90:y:1988:i:3:p:435-46
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1988
|
Testing the democratic hypothesis in the provision of local public goods
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
1987
|
Introduction
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
1987
|
Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality : Behavior and regulation
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1987
|
Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1987
|
Optimal taxation of a non-linear pricing monopolist
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
1
|
|
1987
|
Auctioning Incentive Contracts.
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
1986
|
Disequilibrium Econometrics on Micro Data
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
3
|
|
1986
|
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1986
|
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms.
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
1985
|
Average cost pricing versus marginal cost pricing under moral hazard
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1985
|
repec:bla:econom:v:52:y:1985:i:206:p:153-65
|
Economica
|
C
|
2
|
|
1984
|
Participation constraints in the vickrey auction
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
1984
|
A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1983
|
Taxation and risk taking in general equilibrium models with free entry
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1983
|
A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1982
|
A test of the equilibrium hypothesis based on inventories: A Communication
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
3
|
|
1982
|
A test of the equilibrium hypothesis based on inventories : A communication
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
3
|
|
1982
|
On the robustness of strategy proof mechanisms
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
1982
|
Introduction
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
1982
|
Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
1981
|
Disequilibrium dynamics with inventories and anticipatory price-setting
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
1980
|
On the backward-forward procedure
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
3
|
|
1980
|
Optimal reservation price in the Vickery auction
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
1979
|
repec:bla:scandj:v:81:y:1979:i:2:p:227-37
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
1979
|
repec:bla:scandj:v:81:y:1979:i:3:p:443-44
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1979
|
Disequilibrium econometrics in dynamic models
|
Journal of Econometrics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1979
|
On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1979
|
A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion.
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
1978
|
Satisfactory mechanisms for environments with consumption lower bounds
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1978
|
Taxing price makers
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1978
|
repec:bla:scandj:v:80:y:1978:i:1:p:20-33
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1978
|
Decentralization with externalities
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
1978
|
More on Prices vs. Quantities: Erratum
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
1
|
|
1977
|
On the revelation of preferences for public goods
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1977
|
Imperfect personal information and the demand revealing process: A sampling approach
|
Public Choice
|
B
|
2
|
|
1977
|
More on Prices vs. Quantities
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
1
|
|
1976
|
Partial equilibrium approach to the free-rider problem
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
1976
|
Risk, stochastic preference, and the value of information: A comment
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
1976
|
Court against moral hazard
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1976
|
Collective factors of production under uncertainty
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
1
|
|
1975
|
repec:bla:econom:v:42:y:1975:i:168:p:430-37
|
Economica
|
C
|
1
|
|
1975
|
On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1975
|
Optimism and experts against adverse selection in a competitive economy
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
1975
|
First-Order Certainty Equivalence with Instrument-Dependent Randomness
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
1
|