Institution: Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement (CIRED)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.34 |
| Last 10 Years | 1.01 | 1.68 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 7.37 |
| All Time | 2.01 | 10.72 | 2.01 | 0.00 | 31.50 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts | Journal of Econometrics | A | 3 |
| 2020 | On the Benefits of Set-Asides | Journal of the European Economic Association | A | 2 |
| 2018 | A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis | Journal of Political Economy | S | 2 |
| 2015 | On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2015 | On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |
| 2013 | “Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry? | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 1 |
| 2012 | The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders | Journal of Econometrics | A | 1 |
| 2012 | On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2010 | Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2009 | The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |