Institution: Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 29% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.36 | 3.36 | 78% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 2017 | Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2011 | The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 3 |
| 1992 | On the Nash equilibrium property of an auction matching game | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 1991 | Finitely optimal allocation in countably large-square exchange economies | Economics Letters | C | 1 |