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Johan N. M. Lagerlöf

Institution: Københavns Universitet

Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.johanlagerlof.com

First Publication: 2003

Most Recent: 2024

RePEc ID: pla53 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 0.00 4.04 2.02 0.00 6.05 88%
Last 10 Years 0.00 4.04 8.07 0.00 12.11 92%
All Time 0.00 4.04 17.15 0.50 21.70 94%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 13
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 20.19

Publications (13)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2024 Bertrand under Uncertainty: Private and Common Costs Journal of Industrial Economics A 1
2023 Surfing incognito: Welfare effects of anonymous shopping International Journal of Industrial Organization B 1
2020 Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 1
2020 Strategic gains from discrimination European Economic Review B 1
2018 Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets: What Are the Welfare Effects? Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 2
2018 Monopoly Insurance and Endogenous Information International Economic Review B 2
2008 Eliciting demand information through cheap talk: An argument in favor of a ban on price discrimination Economics Letters C 2
2007 A Model of Reputation in Cheap Talk* Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 2
2007 Insisting on a non-negative price: Oligopoly, uncertainty, welfare, and multiple equilibria International Journal of Industrial Organization B 1
2005 On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2004 Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information? Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 1
2003 Hiding information in electoral competition Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2003 Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness. Public Choice B 1