Institution: Harvard University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://www.shengwu.li
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 1.61 | 0.00 | 0.74 | 0.00 | 2.35 | 61% |
| Last 10 Years | 24.49 | 2.02 | 1.75 | 1.01 | 29.26 | 99% |
| All Time | 24.49 | 2.02 | 1.75 | 1.01 | 29.26 | 96% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Splitting the Difference in Incomplete‐information Bargaining: Theory and Widespread Evidence from the Field | International Economic Review | B | 6 |
| 2023 | Algorithmic Mechanism Design With Investment | Econometrica | S | 5 |
| 2021 | Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson | Scandanavian Journal of Economics | B | 5 |
| 2020 | Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets | Journal of Political Economy | S | 3 |
| 2020 | Credible Auctions: A Trilemma | Econometrica | S | 2 |
| 2018 | Belief updating and the demand for information | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2018 | Context-dependent choice as explained by foraging theory | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2017 | Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms | American Economic Review | S | 1 |
| 2017 | Obvious Ex Post Equilibrium | American Economic Review | S | 1 |
| 2017 | Ethics and market design | Oxford Review of Economic Policy | C | 1 |