Institution: University of British Columbia
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 1.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.02 |
| All Time | 8.38 | 1.34 | 3.02 | 0.00 | 39.21 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Discriminatory Information Disclosure | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2013 | Optimal limited authority for principal | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2013 | MISINFORMATION | International Economic Review | B | 2 |
| 2012 | Competing for talents | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2007 | Price discrimination and efficient matching | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2005 | Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting | Review of Economic Studies | S | 3 |
| 2004 | Delegating Decisions to Experts | Journal of Political Economy | S | 2 |
| 2001 | Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 2001 | A Theory of Conservatism | Journal of Political Economy | S | 1 |
| 2000 | Sequential Screening | Review of Economic Studies | S | 2 |
| 2000 | Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting | Journal of Political Economy | S | 2 |
| 1999 | How complex are networks playing repeated games? | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 1998 | Unraveling in Matching Markets. | American Economic Review | S | 2 |