Institution: Paris School of Economics
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 1.01 | 2.35 | 0.00 | 3.36 | 71% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 1.01 | 3.03 | 1.01 | 5.05 | 72% |
| All Time | 2.02 | 1.01 | 3.03 | 1.01 | 7.06 | 85% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Political Brinkmanship and Compromise | International Economic Review | B | 3 |
| 2024 | Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2024 | Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation | Journal of the European Economic Association | A | 4 |
| 2021 | Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2018 | Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |
| 2017 | Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Optimal Apportionment | Journal of Political Economy | S | 4 |