Institution: Paris School of Economics
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.50 | 2.35 | 0.00 | 3.35 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.50 | 5.03 | 0.00 | 6.03 |
| All Time | 0.50 | 0.50 | 5.03 | 0.00 | 8.04 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | POLITICAL BRINKMANSHIP AND COMPROMISE | International Economic Review | B | 3 |
| 2024 | Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2024 | Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation | Journal of the European Economic Association | A | 4 |
| 2021 | Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2018 | Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 1 |
| 2017 | Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Optimal Apportionment | Journal of Political Economy | S | 4 |