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Jordi Masso

Global rank #1851 97%

Institution: Barcelona School of Economics (BSE)

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://sites.google.com/view/jordi-masso/home

First Publication: 1989

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pma318 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 2.35 0.00 2.35
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.67 5.36 0.00 6.70
All Time 0.00 6.94 18.77 0.00 32.64

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 28
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 25.82

Publications (28)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2023 Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains Journal of Mathematical Economics B 3
2021 Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238] Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2020 On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2020 On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2018 ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS International Economic Review B 2
2017 Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2015 The division problem under constraints Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2015 Matching markets under (in)complete information Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2015 On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good Journal of Economic Theory A 5
2014 On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2012 On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2011 On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2010 The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model Journal of Mathematical Economics B 4
2008 Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2008 Weighted approval voting Economic Theory B 2
2007 Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2007 Bribe-proof rules in the division problem Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2005 Voting by committees under constraints Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2003 Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2001 Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2000 Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings Journal of Economic Theory A 4
1998 Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges Games and Economic Behavior B 3
1997 Voting under Constraints Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1997 Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1996 A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1993 Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players Journal of Mathematical Economics B 1
1989 More on the "anti-folk theorem" Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2