Institution: University of Tokyo
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~amatsui
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 15.14 | 6.05 | 0.50 | 21.70 | 94% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | Voice matters in a dictator game | Experimental Economics | A | 4 |
| 2006 | Rationalizable foresight dynamics | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2005 | Learning aspiration in repeated games | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2000 | Specialization of Labor and the Distribution of Income | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 1996 | A Model of Fiat Money and Barter | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1995 | Induction and the Ramsey policy | Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | B | 2 |
| 1995 | Evolution in Mechanisms for Public Projects. | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 1995 | An Approach to Equilibrium Selection | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1992 | A model of random matching | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 1992 | Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 1991 | Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 1989 | Information leakage forces cooperation | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |