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Hitoshi Matsushima

Global rank #1315 98%

Institution: University of Tokyo

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/finance-g/english/teacher/04.html

First Publication: 1988

Most Recent: 2022

RePEc ID: pma67 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 2.01 0.00 2.01
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 2.68 0.00 2.68
All Time 0.00 20.78 2.68 0.00 50.77

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 21
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 36.69

Publications (21)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2022 Epistemological implementation of social choice functions Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2020 Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2013 Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2010 Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2008 Behavioral aspects of implementation theory Economics Letters C 1
2008 Role of honesty in full implementation Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2008 Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2007 Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2001 Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1994 Exact Implementation Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1993 Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1991 Efficiency in partnerships Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1991 On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part I: anti-folk theorem without communication Economics Letters C 1
1991 On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part II: revelation through communication Economics Letters C 1
1991 Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information Economics Letters C 1
1991 Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1990 Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games : Two-principal case Economics Letters C 2
1990 Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information Economics Letters C 1
1990 Long-term partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching Economics Letters C 1
1989 Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1988 A new approach to the implementation problem Journal of Economic Theory A 1