Institution: Kobe University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://www2.kobe-u.ac.jp/~emiya437/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 4.02 | 5.36 | 0.00 | 13.91 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Decentralized matching: The role of commitment | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2008 | The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2007 | Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2007 | Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2006 | Temptation, self-control, and competitive nonlinear pricing | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2004 | Random paths to stability in the roommate problem | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2002 | Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2002 | Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2001 | House Allocation with Transfers | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |