Institution: Barcelona School of Economics (BSE)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.01 | 3.02 | 0.00 | 7.04 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |
| 2012 | Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2010 | Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry | Economic Theory | B | 1 |