Institution: Unknown
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 5.38 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 6.05 | 88% |
| Last 10 Years | 11.44 | 4.04 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 16.15 | 95% |
| All Time | 11.44 | 4.04 | 2.69 | 1.01 | 19.17 | 93% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Coasian equilibria in sequential auctions | European Economic Review | B | 3 |
| 2024 | Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: The Wald Problem with Ambiguity | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 2023 | Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion | Journal of Political Economy | S | 3 |
| 2019 | Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2019 | Auctions with Limited Commitment | American Economic Review | S | 4 |
| 2016 | Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2013 | The Dynamic Vickrey Auction | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2011 | Asymmetric reduced form Auctions | Economics Letters | C | 1 |