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Wieland Müller

Global rank #2340 97%

Institution: Universität Wien

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/

First Publication: 2000

Most Recent: 2024

RePEc ID: pml15 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 2.01 0.00 2.01
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 2.01 0.00 2.01
All Time 0.00 2.35 19.94 0.00 28.65

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 37
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 31.81

Publications (37)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2024 Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2021 Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2021 Cooperation in infinitely repeated games of strategic complements and substitutes Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 3
2014 Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting Journal of Industrial Economics A 3
2014 Taxation and Market Power Canadian Journal of Economics C 3
2014 Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence European Economic Review B 3
2013 Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2012 Collusion in experimental Bertrand duopolies with convex costs: The role of cost asymmetry International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2012 Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: Experimental evidence Economics Letters C 4
2012 The distribution of harm in price-fixing cases International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2012 Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2012 Framing effects and impatience: Evidence from a large scale experiment Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 4
2012 Allais for all: Revisiting the paradox in a large representative sample Journal of Risk and Uncertainty B 2
2011 Collusion through price ceilings? In search of a focal-point effect Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2009 The miracle as a randomization device: A lesson from Richard Wagner's romantic opera Tannhäuser und der Sängerkrieg auf Wartburg Economics Letters C 3
2009 Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2008 Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2006 From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence Experimental Economics A 4
2006 Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market Economics Letters C 3
2006 Noisy leadership: An experimental approach Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2006 Allowing for two production periods in the Cournot duopoly: Experimental evidence Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2005 Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2004 repec:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i:284:p:575-587 Economica C 3
2004 Strategic delegation in experimental markets International Journal of Industrial Organization B 3
2003 On the profitability of collusion in location games Journal of Urban Economics A 3
2002 Tax Liability‐Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted‐Offer Markets Southern Economic Journal C 4
2002 Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: experimental evidence International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2002 To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2001 Divisionalization in contests Economics Letters C 3
2001 Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets Economics Letters C 3
2001 Why firms should care for customers Economics Letters C 2
2001 The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2001 The quality of the signal matters -- a note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2000 Why the Rich Are Nastier Than the Poor – A Note on the Distribution of Wealth When Individuals Care for Payoff Differentials Kyklos C 2
2000 repec:bla:kyklos:v:53:y:2000:i:2:p:153-59 Kyklos C 2
2000 Perfect versus Imperfect Observability--An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2000 An Experimental Analysis of Intertemporal Allocation Behavior Experimental Economics A 4