Institution: Universidad de Málaga
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://bernardo.moreno.jimenez.googlepages.com/bernardomoreno
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 2.69 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.84 | 3.53 | 61% |
| All Time | 2.69 | 1.35 | 2.35 | 2.35 | 8.75 | 87% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2019 | Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness | Economics Letters | C | 3 |
| 2016 | Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 2012 | Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2011 | Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2010 | Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2006 | Bargaining and waning commitments | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2002 | The Scholarship Assignment Problem | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2002 | Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity | Economics Letters | C | 1 |