Institution: Unknown
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.03 | 0.34 | 3.36 | 77% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Fair by design: Multidimensional envy-free mechanisms | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2009 | Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem | Social Choice and Welfare | C | 3 |
| 2008 | Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |