Institution: Universitat de Barcelona
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.67 | 3.02 | 0.00 | 4.36 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.67 | 3.69 | 0.00 | 5.03 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 1.68 | 6.37 | 0.00 | 9.72 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |
| 2022 | Stable cores in information graph games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2022 | Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2021 | Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2020 | A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2011 | Assignment markets with the same core | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2009 | A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2008 | On the dimension of the core of the assignment game | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |