Institution: Universitat de Barcelona
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 1.35 | 2.02 | 0.50 | 3.87 | 74% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 1.35 | 2.02 | 0.84 | 4.20 | 67% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 3.36 | 4.71 | 0.84 | 8.91 | 87% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 2022 | Stable cores in information graph games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2022 | Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2021 | Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2020 | A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 3 |
| 2013 | Von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2011 | Assignment markets with the same core | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2009 | A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2008 | On the dimension of the core of the assignment game | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |