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Alejandro Neme

Global rank #5400 93%

Institution: Universidad Nacional de San Luis

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 1992

Most Recent: 2020

RePEc ID: pne273 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.34
All Time 0.00 5.53 4.36 0.00 15.42

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 13
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 9.93

Publications (13)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2020 On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2015 The division problem under constraints Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2014 On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2012 On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2010 The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model Journal of Mathematical Economics B 4
2007 Bribe-proof rules in the division problem Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2005 Voting by committees under constraints Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2001 Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2000 Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings Journal of Economic Theory A 4
1997 Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules Games and Economic Behavior B 3
1997 Voting under Constraints Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1995 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1992 Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation Journal of Economic Theory A 2