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Matias Nuñez

Institution: Unknown

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://sites.google.com/site/matiasnunezrodriguez/

First Publication: 2014

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pnu19 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 0.00 2.69 2.35 1.18 6.22 88%
Last 10 Years 0.00 4.71 5.05 1.68 11.44 90%
All Time 0.00 4.71 7.06 3.70 15.47 92%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 17
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 16.82

Publications (17)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Political Brinkmanship and Compromise International Economic Review B 3
2025 Price and Choose American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2025 Two principles for two-person social choice Social Choice and Welfare C 3
2023 Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2022 On the implementation of the median Journal of Mathematical Economics C 3
2022 The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement Economic Journal A 3
2021 A solution to the two-person implementation problem Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2021 On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules Social Choice and Welfare C 2
2019 Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2017 Reaching consensus through approval bargaining Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2017 Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 2
2017 Implementation via approval mechanisms Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2017 Dominance solvable approval voting games Journal of Public Economic Theory C 2
2015 Bargaining through Approval Journal of Mathematical Economics C 2
2015 Threshold voting leads to Type-Revelation Economics Letters C 1
2014 The strategic sincerity of Approval voting Economic Theory B 1
2014 Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections Social Choice and Welfare C 2