Institution: Unknown
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://sites.google.com/site/matiasnunezrodriguez/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 1.34 | 2.35 | 0.00 | 5.03 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.35 | 5.03 | 0.00 | 9.72 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.35 | 8.04 | 0.00 | 13.74 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Price and Choose | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2023 | Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2022 | The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement | Economic Journal | A | 3 |
| 2022 | On the implementation of the median | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 3 |
| 2021 | A solution to the two-person implementation problem | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2019 | Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2017 | Reaching consensus through approval bargaining | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2017 | Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices | Scandanavian Journal of Economics | B | 2 |
| 2017 | Implementation via approval mechanisms | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2015 | Bargaining through Approval | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |
| 2015 | Threshold voting leads to Type-Revelation | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2014 | The strategic sincerity of Approval voting | Economic Theory | B | 1 |