Institution: Paris School of Economics
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6.05 | 3.03 | 9.08 | 87% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | The structure of unstable power mechanisms | Economic Theory | B | 1 |
| 2009 | Interaction sheaves on continuous domains | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 1998 | Tight and Effectively Rectangular Game Forms: A Nash Solvable Class | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1994 | Strongly consistent two-player game forms | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 1991 | Maxmin and minmax for coalitional game forms | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1989 | Correlated effectivity functions | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 1987 | Stable effectivity functions with an infinity of players and alternatives | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |