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Pablo Guillen

Global rank #7720 91%

Institution: University of Sydney

Primary Field: Experimental (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://www.sydney.edu.au/arts/about/our-people/academic-staff/pablo-guillen.html

First Publication: 2007

Most Recent: 2021

RePEc ID: ppa197 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 1.01 0.00 0.00 2.01
Last 10 Years 0.00 2.01 1.01 0.00 5.03
All Time 0.00 3.02 7.11 0.00 13.47

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 12
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 10.84

Publications (12)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2021 Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets Experimental Economics A 2
2018 The effectiveness of top-down advice in strategy-proof mechanisms: A field experiment European Economic Review B 2
2017 Not quite the best response: truth-telling, strategy-proof matching, and the manipulation of others Experimental Economics A 2
2014 Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism European Economic Review B 2
2012 On “lab rats” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics B 2
2012 MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM International Economic Review B 2
2011 Trust, discrimination and acculturation Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics B 2
2010 Gender selection discrimination: Evidence from a Trust game Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2009 The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions International Journal of Industrial Organization B 5
2008 Math skills and risk attitudes Economics Letters C 3
2007 COLLUSION AND FIGHTS IN AN EXPERIMENT WITH PRICE‐SETTING FIRMS AND ADVANCE PRODUCTION* Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2007 Why feed the Leviathan? Public Choice B 3