Institution: University of Toronto
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 8.07 | 4.04 | 5.05 | 0.00 | 17.15 | 93% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2004 | An economic theory of leadership turnover | Journal of Public Economics | A | 2 |
| 1993 | Commitment, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1988 | Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission: Correction. | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 1987 | Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission. | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 1986 | Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1983 | Profit-sharing in a collusive industry | European Economic Review | B | 2 |