Institution: Amherst College
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.02 | 2.02 | 1.01 | 5.05 | 72% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 3.03 | 2.02 | 1.01 | 6.05 | 84% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 2018 | Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2016 | Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2016 | Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2010 | The welfare costs of unreliable water service | Journal of Development Economics | A | 4 |