Institution: Université Paris-Saclay
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 2.02 | 1.68 | 0.00 | 3.70 | 73% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 8.07 | 2.69 | 0.00 | 10.76 | 90% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 8.07 | 2.69 | 0.00 | 10.76 | 89% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2024 | The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification | American Economic Review: Insights | A | 2 |
| 2022 | Information design in sequential procurement | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2020 | Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2017 | Mediated audits | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 1 |
| 2016 | Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification | European Economic Review | B | 2 |