Institution: Universidad Nacional de San Luis
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.01 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 6.54 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1995 | Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1994 | The shapley value of resale-proof trades | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 1992 | Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1991 | Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 1988 | Uniqueness of nash equilibrium points in bimatrix games | Economics Letters | C | 1 |