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Stefan Reichelstein

Institution: Stanford University

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://gobi.stanford.edu/facultybios/bio.asp?ID=249

First Publication: 1984

Most Recent: 2000

RePEc ID: pre61 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
All Time 4.04 18.16 1.68 2.52 26.41 95%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 13
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 16.83

Publications (13)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2000 Comparative statics of monopoly pricing Economic Theory B 2
1998 Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies, Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1997 Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 3
1996 Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment. American Economic Review S 2
1992 The revelation approach to nash implementation Economics Letters C 2
1992 Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1989 Value of communication in agencies Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1987 A note on feasible implementations Economics Letters C 1
1985 Information-eliciting compensation schemes Journal of Public Economics A 2
1984 Incentives in government contracts Journal of Public Economics A 2
1984 Incentive compatibility and informational requirements Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1984 Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms Economics Letters C 1
1984 A note on allocations attainable through nash equilibria Journal of Economic Theory A 1