Institution: University of Surrey
Primary Field: Health (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.02 | 1.35 | 2.94 | 6.31 | 84% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | Favouritism and Financial Incentives: A Natural Experiment | Economica | C | 2 |
| 2007 | Liability, insurance and medical practice | Journal of Health Economics | B | 3 |
| 2007 | Standard fees for legal aid: an empirical analysis of incentives and contracts | Oxford Economic Papers | C | 3 |
| 2007 | Optimal sliding scale regulation: an application to regional electricity distribution in England and Wales | Oxford Economic Papers | C | 4 |
| 2007 | The Determinants of Employee Crime in the UK | Economica | C | 2 |
| 1999 | Professional Autonomy and the Cost of Legal Aid. | Oxford Economic Papers | C | 3 |
| 1999 | Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox | Journal of Public Economics | A | 2 |
| 1994 | Contracts and supply assurance in the UK health care market | Journal of Health Economics | B | 3 |
| 1994 | The Economics of Contingency Fees in Personal Injury Litigation. | Oxford Review of Economic Policy | C | 1 |